Chapter 40: The Failure of Kinetic Force

Timeframe: 2005 – 2025
Location: Nigeria’s South East, North East, policy think tanks
Key Actors: Nigerian Armed Forces, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

Epigraph:

“Twenty years of shoot-to-kill responses have generated more armed actors, not fewer.”
— ICRC conflict brief, 2022 [1].

The Narrative Opening

The Camera Lens

Every few months, the Army announces another “Operation Python Dance” or “Golden Dawn.” Armored carriers roll into villages; arrests spike; social media floods with images of burnt homes. Yet violence persists. Data shows a grim truth: kinetic force alone cannot extinguish grievances.

Section 1: The Cycle of Violence

ICRC briefings note that heavy-handed raids often trigger revenge attacks, feeding a tit-for-tat spiral [1]. Communities caught in the middle view security forces as occupiers, not protectors.

Section 2: Lessons from other theatres

USIP studies comparing the Niger Delta amnesty and Colombia’s FARC demobilization conclude that political concessions and inclusion worked better than perpetual offensives [2]. Nigeria’s insistence on military primacy ignores these lessons.

The “Investigative Evidence” Box

Exhibit AN: USIP Working Paper “Negotiating with Armed Movements” (2024)

• Recommends dialogue and conditional amnesty over purely kinetic responses.
  
• Cites IPOB as a candidate for non-military engagement.

The Verdict

Guns can hold territory but cannot win legitimacy. Persisting with kinetic responses guarantees more hydra heads. Diplomacy is not capitulation; it is strategy.

Chapter Endnotes / Citations

• [1] International Committee of the Red Cross. (2022). Nigeria: Dialogue Still Possible in the South-East.
  
• [2] United States Institute of Peace. (2024). Negotiating with Armed Movements: Lessons for Nigeria.