Timeframe: 2010–2012
Location: The National Assembly Complex, Abuja / London
Key Actors: Nnamdi Kanu, The Nigerian Senate, The South-East Political Caucus
Epigraph:
“Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.”
— John F. Kennedy (Referenced by Nnamdi Kanu in a letter to the Ohanaeze Ndigbo, 2011) [1].
The Camera Lens
The mailroom of the National Assembly in Abuja is a graveyard of good intentions. It is a stifling, windowless space where sacks of petitions from citizens gather dust, waiting for legislative aides who rarely come.
In 2010, amidst the sacks of complaints about roads and water, there were letters postmarked from London. They were typed on crisp A4 paper, formatted with British precision, and signed by a man who still believed that the pen could move the Giant.
Nnamdi Kanu did not approach Abuja with a microphone or a flag. He approached with a dossier. He wore suits, not the Jewish prayer shawl. He sought audience, not agitation. He walked the corridors of power in the South East, knocking on the doors of Governors and Senators, clutching a blueprint for “Regional Autonomy” within the Nigerian Federation.
The Camera Lens captures the scene in a Senator’s waiting room in Enugu. Kanu sits for six hours, watching the “Big Men” breeze past him, surrounded by sycophants and armed MOPOL guards. He is invisible. He has no “Godfather.” He has brought no “Ghana-Must-Go” bags filled with cash. He has only ideas.
And in the political economy of Nigeria, an idea without a budget is a noise without a frequency.
Forensic examination of Kanu’s early correspondence reveals a startling contradiction to his later persona. The man who would later call Nigeria a “Zoo” initially treated it as a Republic worthy of debate.
The timeline of correspondence tells a story of escalating desperation. In March 2010, Kanu sent his first letter to the Senate Committee on Constitution Review, requesting a hearing on restructuring proposals. When no response came, he sent a follow-up letter in May 2010, this time with a detailed policy paper attached. By August 2010, he was writing to the South-East Senators’ Caucus, requesting a regional meeting. In November 2010, he expanded his reach, writing to British MPs representing constituencies with high Nigerian populations, requesting support for restructuring advocacy. February 2011 brought a letter to the National Assembly Joint Committee on Constitutional Review. June 2011 saw an open letter to Ohanaeze Ndigbo—the letter referenced in the epigraph. By September 2011, he sent a final letter to the Senate President, warning of the consequences of ignoring reform demands. By 2012, he had shifted from letter-writing to direct engagement attempts—meetings and petitions that would also be ignored.
Between 2010 and 2012, Kanu engaged in what political scientists call “Institutional Petitioning.” He wrote to the Senate Committee on Constitution Review. He wrote to the British MPs representing constituencies with high Nigerian populations [2].
The March 2010 letter to the Senate Committee on Constitution Review reveals the tone and substance of his early approach. It began: “Honorable Members of the Senate Committee on Constitution Review, I write as a concerned Nigerian citizen and member of the diaspora community to propose urgent constitutional reforms that would strengthen our federation and address growing regional grievances.” The letter argued that the current centralized structure had failed to deliver security, development, or equity. It proposed three reforms: the devolution of policing powers to states, fiscal federalism where states would control their resources and pay taxes to the center, and constitutional restructuring returning to the 1963 Constitution model. The letter ended with an offer: “I am available to appear before your committee to present these proposals in detail. I believe that through dialogue and reform, we can build a stronger, more equitable Nigeria.” It was signed “Respectfully, Nnamdi Okwu Kanu, London, United Kingdom.”
The response status tells its own story. The Senate Committee sent no acknowledgment. The South-East Senators sent no response. The British MPs sent two acknowledgments but took no action. The National Assembly marked the file “Received” but initiated no follow-up.
The Content of the Letters:
These were not secessionist manifestos. They were policy papers.
He argued for the devolution of policing powers to the states—a debate that Nigeria would only take seriously a decade later with Amotekun and Ebube Agu.
He argued for fiscal federalism, citing the 1963 Constitution as the only working model for a multi-ethnic state [3].
He warned that the rising unemployment in the South East was a “ticking time bomb” that would lead to militancy if not addressed through regional economic control.
The specific policy proposals were detailed and constitutional. He drafted a State Police Bill, a detailed proposal for constitutional amendment allowing states to establish their own police forces. He proposed a Resource Control Amendment, seeking to amend Section 162 of the Constitution to allow states to control their resources. He designed a Regional Development Fund, proposing regional economic development funds similar to the 1963 Constitution model. He called for a Constitutional Conference, proposing a national conference on restructuring—similar to what would happen in 2014, but by then it would be too late.
The Disinterested Observer notes the tone: it was urgent, but it was civil. It was the voice of a stakeholder, not an enemy combatant. He was attempting to use the democratic channels provided by the 1999 Constitution to fix the flaws of that very Constitution.
Why did the Elites ignore him?
To understand this, one must analyze the psychology of the Nigerian ruling class during the oil boom years (2010–2014). Oil prices were hovering around $100 per barrel. The political class was awash in petrodollars. The system was working perfectly for them.
They viewed men like Kanu—Diaspora intellectuals—as “irritants.” They lacked the “war chest” (money) to buy influence and the “thugs” to command fear. In the calculus of Nigerian politics, if you cannot bribe and you cannot shoot, you do not exist [4].
The Strategic Error:
The South East Governors and Senators made a catastrophic miscalculation. They assumed that because Kanu had no political structure (no party, no godfathers), he had no power. They failed to understand Asymmetric Power.
By shutting the door on Kanu the Reformer, they forced him to find a new room. When the Senate President’s office did not reply to his letters, he stopped writing to the Senate. He turned to the microphone.
He realized that if the Elites would not listen to logic in the boardroom, they might listen to fire on the radio. The deafness of the status quo did not silence him; it amplified him.
Source: Anecdotal Account from an Aide to a South-East Governor (2011).
Context: Kanu attempted to present a proposal on “Regional Security” to handle kidnapping in the East.
The Proposal Document:
Kanu had prepared a comprehensive proposal titled “Regional Security Framework for the South-East: A Proposal to Address the Kidnapping Crisis.” The document included an analysis of the kidnapping crisis in the South-East between 2010 and 2011, a proposal for state-level security apparatus, budget estimates and implementation plan, a legal framework for state police including constitutional amendment proposals, and community engagement strategies.
The Meeting Attempt:
The incident occurred in late 2011, though the specific date remains undocumented. The location was the Governor’s Lodge in Asokoro, Abuja. Kanu waited approximately six hours. Present were Kanu, the Governor’s Chief of Staff, and various aides and security personnel.
The Incident:
An aide recalls Kanu waiting at the Governor’s Lodge in Asokoro, Abuja. After hours of waiting, a Chief of Staff emerged, looked at Kanu’s proposal, and allegedly asked:
“Who is sponsoring this? Is there money for the boys?”
When Kanu replied that it was a civic initiative for the safety of the people, the file was dropped on a table. He was told the Governor was “too busy.”
The Exchange (As Recalled by the Aide):
The Chief of Staff asked: “Who sent you? Who is your sponsor?” Kanu replied: “I am here on behalf of the people. This is about security for our communities.” The Chief of Staff pressed: “Is there money for implementation? Who will pay for this?” Kanu explained: “This is a policy proposal. The state government would fund it through security budgets.” The Chief of Staff dismissed him: “The Governor is very busy. Leave your file. We will review it.” The file was placed on a table, not in the Governor’s office.
The Aftermath:
Kanu left the lodge that night. The file was never reviewed. No follow-up meeting was scheduled. The proposal was effectively discarded.
The Irony:
Three years later, that same Governor would be begging the Federal Government to stop Kanu’s boys (ESN) from entering the forests. The very security framework Kanu had proposed—state-level security to address kidnapping—would become a reality, but through ESN rather than official channels.
This incident is not unique. Similar proposals from other diaspora activists and local intellectuals were also ignored during this period. The pattern suggests a systemic failure to engage with reformist voices, regardless of their merit.
The Closing Argument
The tragedy of Chapter 2 is the tragedy of the “Road Not Taken.”
Nnamdi Kanu did not wake up one morning and decide to destroy Nigeria. He was pushed into that decision by a system that has no mechanism for self-correction.
The Nigerian Elites believe that power is absolute. They believe that anyone outside the “corridors of power” is irrelevant. They looked at a Prince from Afaraukwu and saw a nobody. They did not see the anger of a generation accumulating behind him.
By refusing to read the letters written in ink, they ensured that the next message would be written in blood.
What happens when a man realizes that “Civility” is interpreted as “Weakness”?
[1] Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) Archives. (2011). Open Letter to Ohanaeze Ndigbo: The Danger of Silence. London.
[2] Kanu, Nnamdi. (2010–2012). Collection of Correspondence to UK Parliamentarians regarding Nigeria’s Structural Defects. (Private Archive).
[3] The 1963 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (Reference to the Fiscal Federalism clauses cited by Kanu).
[4] Joseph, Richard. (1987). Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria. Cambridge University Press. (Analysis of the ‘Godfather’ and patronage system that excludes non-monetized actors).
Additional Sources for Further Research: - Senate Committee on Constitution Review records (2010-2012) - National Assembly correspondence logs (FOI requests) - British MPs’ correspondence records (if accessible) - South-East Governors’ Lodge visitor logs (2011) - Comparative analysis of other ignored reform movements (Niger Delta, Middle Belt, etc.)
Visual Elements Needed: - Timeline showing all letters sent and responses (or lack thereof) - Flowchart showing path of letters through bureaucratic system - Comparison table: Kanu’s proposals vs. what was implemented later (Amotekun, Ebube Agu) - Map showing locations of meetings and letter destinations